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CIVIL PROCEDURE-J OINDER OF STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION WITH COM-
MON LAW NEGLIGENCE WHERE THERE ARE DIFFERENT PARTIES DEFENDANT-
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant for injuries received in an 
automobile accident caused by defendant's negligence in driving while 
intoxicated. She sought to join with this claim actions against several bar 
owners under a statute providing for liability of bar owners for injuries 
caused by one to whom they had unlawfully sold alcoholic beverages.1 One 
of the defendant bar owners moved to dismiss for misjoinder or to compel 
an election of causes on the ground that since only compensatory damages 
could be recovered against the defendant-consumer upon common law neg-
ligence, and both exemplary and compensatory damages could be recov-
ered against the bar owners under the statutory cause, it would be impos-
sible for the court properly to instruct the jury without confusing them as 
to the issues, with resulting prejudice to the bar owners. Held, joinder 
allowed. The Michigan joinder provision provides for joinder of causes 
and multiple defendants when the liability is one asserted against all of 
the defendants or sufficient grounds shall appear for uniting the causes of 
action " ... in order to promote the convenient administration of justice."2 
It would be unjust to force a plaintiff under these circumstances to choose 
her target from among the defendants, all of whom in violation of the 
law contributed to her injuries. Since the court could direct the jury to 
bring in separate verdicts on the different causes, this joinder would not 
prejudice the defendant.3 Ruediger v. Klink, (Mich. 1956) 78 N.W. (2d) 
248. 
The twentieth century trend in joinder has emphasized free joinder 
guided by principles of trial convenience.4 The wording of the Michigan 
joinder provision is probably the broadest in use at this time.5 It places 
no limit upon joinder except that of trial convenience. Because of this 
1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Mason's Supp. 1954) §436.22. 
2 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §608.1. 
s Michigan Court Rule 37, §7, originally rule 70, adopted in Lewis v. Bricker, 232 
Mich. 388, 205 N.W. 98 (1925). The court stated that the joinder statute necessarily car-
ried with it authority to direct separate verdicts and to enter separate judgments, and 
the purpose of this rule was merely to clarify and make certain the practice under the 
statute. 
4 See 37 CoL. L. REv. 462 (1937); 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., 1803-1807 (1948). 
5 Fla. Stat. (1943) §46.08, is very similar to the Michigan provision. 
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broadness, however, there is no concrete test which can be applied in each 
case.,- Each case must be decided on its own merits so that the final test is a 
weighing of the convenience of the party seeking the joinder and that of 
the party seeking dismissal or an election.6 The first cases under the Mich-
igan joinder statute seemed either to ignore it or to hold that it was meant 
only to allow joinder where it would have been allowed at common law.1 
Application of the rules set forth in most of these early cases to the prin-
cipal case probably would have resulted in a holding of misjoinder.8 Since 
these decisions, however, the federal joinder provisions have been adopted 
for federal courts and many states have adopted provisions with substan-
tially similar wording.9 The federal rules place no limitation on joinder of 
causes so long as the requisites for joinder of parties are met.10 The rule 
for permissive joinder of defendants provides that they may be joined 
where the right to relief arises out of the "same transaction, occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences" and if any common question of law or 
fact is involved.11 Here the right to relief would in each case arise out of 
the accident12 and several common questions of fact would have to be 
proved in each case.13 It is very possible, as the court stated in Otto v. Vil-
lage of Highland Park,14 that at the time the Michigan joinder provision was 
6 "The propriety of consolidation [allowed by statute whenever joinder would be 
possible] is to be determined entirely by the state of facts existing prior to the consolida-
tion." Higdon v. Kelley, 339 Mich. 209 at 222, 63 N.W. (2d) 592 (1954). 
7 See McDonald v. Hall, 193 Mich. 50, 159 N.W. 358 (1916); Albrecht v. Benevolent 
Society, 205 Mich. 395, 171 N.W. 461 (1919); Thomson v. Kent Circuit Judge, 230 Mich. 
354, 203 N.W. 108 (1925); Brewster Loud Lumber Co. v. General Builders' Supply Co., 233 
Mich. 633, 208 N.W. 28 (1926). For many years the leading case on the Michigan statute 
was Otto v. Village of Highland Park, 204 Mich. 74 at 81, 169 N.W. 904 (1918), in which 
the court held, "While its [the Michigan joinder statute's] provisions as to joinder of 
actions and parties are broad in terms .•. , it was not the legislative intent to ignore the 
fundamental principles of procedure to the extent proposed in this declaration where, as 
plaintiffs sound their counts, it is sought to join in a single action and have determined 
the liability of alleged independent tort-feasors for different and distinct torts charged to 
each, without concert of action or community of responsibility, inevitably amounting to 
both a joinder of parties severally liable and a joinder of different causes of action, each 
against a different defendant." 
s See quoted section of decision in Otto v. Village of Highland Park, note 7 supra. 
9 See Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 110, §§24 and 44; Cahill-Parsons New York Civil Practice, 
2d ed., §§212 and 258 (1955); 2 NEW JERSEY PRACTICE, rev. ed., (Waltzinger, 1954) §§4:31-1 
and 4:33-1. 
10 Fed. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 18 (a). 
11 Fed. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 20. 
12 Baker v. Healy, 302 Ill. App. 634, 24 N.E. (2d) 228 (1939), quoting (at 644-645) Van 
Meter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620 at 623-624: "A 'transaction' is something which has taken 
place, whereby a cause of action has arisen. It must therefore consist of an act or agree-
ment, or several acts or agreements having some connection with each other, in which more 
than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons between 
themselves are altered." 
13 For a comparison of the formerly narrow application of the Michigan joinder pro-
vision with application of rule 20 of the federal rules to very similar facts, see Roberts v. 
Fox, 306 Mich. 279, 10 N.W. (2d) 857 (1943) and Olan Mills of Tennessee v. Enterprise 
Pub. Co., (5th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 895. 
14 Note 7 supra. 
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first passed (1915) the legislature did not intend it to be as broad as its 
terms. However, the court in the principal case has stated that since "the 
rule [section 7 of rule 37] and ... statutes are unitedly designed to pro-
mote the convenient administration of justice . . . we see no reason for 
tightening their broad and wholesome purposes in this or like case."15 If 
this can be taken to mean that now the statute is to be broadly interpreted 
in favor of joinder, it is probable that joinder will be allowed at least as 
often under Michigan's broad but ambiguous test as it is under rule 20 of 
the federal rules. It is certainly clear that the court has now rejected the 
prejudice against liberal joinder which was evident in the earlier cases. 
George W. Marti 
15 Principal case at 253. 
